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391 
SAVING THE WORLD ONE CURRENCY AT A 
TIME: IMPLEMENTING THE TOBIN TAX 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Twentieth Century ushered in an era of astounding economic and 
technological growth that continues to be unrestrained by national borders. 
Such expansive growth and globalization affect every nation, enabling 
industrialized countries to achieve unprecedented prosperity. The impact of 
globalization is less favorable on developing nations.1 In order to avail 
themselves of industrialized nations’ capital markets and investors, 
developing nations suffer the loss of control over their national policies, the 
flight of capital to industrialized nations, the weakening of their currencies, 
and the ever-widening economic gap between “have” and “have not” 
countries.2  
Since the liberalization of currency regulations in the 1970s, 
industrialized nations have reaped the benefits of unrestrained currency 
transactions.3 While unavailable under the “pegged” currency valuation 
system established in Bretton Woods after World War II,4 short term 
 
 
 1. The consequences of globalization for developing countries include “unstable exchange 
rates; extensive short -term debt [in the] . . . private sector[]; deteriorating terms of trade; rise of 
protectionism in some in dustrialized countries against manufactured goods in which developing 
countries have a comparative advantage . . .; and the raids of speculation against their currency.” Frank 
R. Rampersad, Coping with Globalization: A Suggested Policy Package for Small Countries, 570 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 115, 116 (July 2000). See Jon Mandle, Globalization and 
Justice, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 126, 134-37 (2000) for an examination of some 
commentators’ views that globalization itself is a threat to culture and tradition that cannot be 
outweighed by developing countries’ needs or the need to control market instability.  
 2. “The July 1999 United Nations Development Report notes that globalization has widened the 
gap in living standards between rich and poor nations, and that the United States has become 
increasingly dominant in both cultural and economic affairs.” David A. Zalewski, Book Review, J. 
ECON. ISSUES, Mar. 1, 2000, at 244. See, e.g. , Harry Barnes, Rich Pickings: A Worldwide Tax on 
Currency Speculation Would Give Billions to the Poor, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2000, available at 
LEXIS, News Library (explaining that international currency speculation has contributed to a great 
deal of the economic turmoil that underlies underdevelopment and poverty in developing countries). 
 3. Beatrice Newbery, Development-Finance: Speculation Tax To Prevent Disasters, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE , Sept. 8, 1999 (noting that the large volume of trading is partly due to the use of 
electronic trading). Commentators speculate that international currency transactions exceed $450 
trillion annually. Brian Kenety, Delegates Quarrel Over Call for Tobin Tax Study, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE , June 30, 2000, available at http://www.ips.org/geneva/0107/gva0107b.htm. Of this, an 
estimated $1.5 trillion in international currency transactions take place daily for speculative purposes 
only. Pointers–Taxing Speculation, FOREIGN  REPORT, June 22, 2000. Currency derivatives are also 
traded at an additional nearly $1 trillion per day. See Newbery, supra. See also Barnes, supra note 2 
(explaining that “80% of the speculation is undertaken in just seven countries and most transactions 
occur in only a few large institutions”).  
 4. Geoffrey G.B. Brow, The Tobin Tax: Turning Soros into Plowshares?, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 345, 350-54 (1999). In an attempt to stabilize the international economy after 
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currency speculation has become a profitable and popular form of investment 
under the free-floating currency system that exists in today’s global 
economy.5 However, economists’ fears that such speculation could 
undermine international currency were not realized until the 1990s, when 
numerous countries felt the devastating impact of market volatility. 6 As a 
result of the volatility, commentators and economists have renewed calls for 
international monetary reform in order to prevent future currency crises.7 
This plea for international monetary reform presents a promising opportunity 
for developing countries. 
In the 1970s, renowned economist James Tobin proposed the creation of 
a tax on international currency transactions, subsequently dubbed the “Tobin 
Tax.”8 The Tobin Tax would simultaneously address the two distinct issues 
of market volatility and aid for developing countries. The tax, originally 
valued at 1% and subsequently reduced to .1%-.25%,9 would increase the 
 
 
World War II, the Allied countries reached an agreement in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire that 
established a “pegged” currency system. Id. at 350. Under the pegged currency system, the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) gave member states a par value for the currency based on its 
value compared to the value of the U.S. dollar, which was based upon the gold standard. Id. at 350-51. 
Member states were required to use the par value unless they received special permission from the 
IMF to change the value of their currency. Id. at 351.   
 5. Over time, member states lost confidence in the Bretton Woods system, ultimat ely electing to 
utilize a free-floating system. Id. at 351-52. By 1973, all major currency countries rejected the Bretton 
Woods model allowing their currencies to float freely. Id. at 352.  
 6. Id. at 368-75 (examining exchange rate crises in Europe, Mexico, and Asia). See also 
Mandle, supra note 1, at 133 (noting the widespread belief that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 was 
exacerbated by short -term currency transactions).  
 7. Brow, supra  note 5, at 375. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. See also Duncan 
Green, Make Global System Work for the Poor, (Apr. 23, 1999), at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ 
socecon/glotax/curtax.cur7_1.htm (advocating reforming the IMF in light of the needs of developing 
countries as highlighted by recent financial crises). Commentators have not limited calls for reform to 
international monetary systems. Domestic exchange rate policies, especially exchange rate 
liberalization, in developing countries are also under fire, however, for contributing to the economic 
degradation that has taken place in those countries since the 1970s. DANI RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL 
ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  MAKING OPENNESS WORK  99, 128 (1999). Some 
developing countries have actively sought to maintain appropriate exchange rates, only to have their 
efforts undermined by international economics. See N.A. Rweyemamu, Foreign Investment Policy: 
Kenya’s Experience, in DEVELOPING WITH  FOREIGN INVESTMENT 260, 277 (Vincent Cable and 
Bishnodat Persaud eds., 1987); RODRIK, supra (demonstrating the importance of international 
economics and approval to leaders of developing countries). Regional exchange policies may also 
affect countries’ economies. For example, member countries of the CFA franc zone had uncompetitive 
exchange rates before the CFA franc’s devaluation in 1994. RODRICK, supra , at 128. 
 8. James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153 (1978), 
reprinted in James Tobin, ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 488 (1982). 
 9. Enriqué R. Carrasco & Kristen J. Berg, Praxis-Oriented Pedagogy: The E-Book on 
International Finance and Development, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 733, 744 (1999). See Jim Barnett, 
DeFazio Seeks Tax to Protect Poorer Nations from Trade Woes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 12, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 5392548 (describing the U.S. Congress’s concurrent resolution, which 
proposes a Tobin-like tax that could be as low as one-tenth of one percent). This estimate may be 
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transaction costs of international financial transactions, thereby reducing the 
short-term profit motivation that drives currency speculation.10 Originally, 
Tobin envisioned that individual countries would assess the tax and collect 
its proceeds for national use.11 As the tax is typically proposed, however, the 
proceeds of the tax would fund international efforts to alleviate poverty or 
would be distributed to developing nations directly as foreign aid.12  
Part I of this Recent Development will examine the oft-ignored needs of 
developing countries, the global circumstances giving rise to those needs, and 
the international community’s failed attempts to address or resolve them. 
This Recent Development will then delve into the background of the Tobin 
Tax and how it responds to the recently resurrected calls for international 
monetary reform. Finally, this Recent Development will examine the 
advantages and disadvantages of the tax, including the two predominant 
hurdles to implementing the tax: enforceability and international cooperation. 
Part II will address the difficulty of implementing a Tobin Tax by 
examining two proposed approaches and discussing how they seek to resolve 
the dual problems of establishing effective enforcement mechanisms and 
attaining international cooperation. The first approach creates an international 
organization that implements and enforces the tax on an international level. 
While this approach is traditionally favored by Tobin Tax proponents, it 
faces the potentially insurmountable obstacle of gaining widespread 
 
 
overly conservative, as it falls at the low end of the .1% to .25% range proposed by most proponents of 
the tax. See U.S., French, European Lawmakers Call for Tax on Global Money Funds, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE , Apr. 11, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter “U.S., French, 
European Lawmakers”].  
 10. U.S., French, European Lawmakers, supra note 9.  
 11. Myron W. Kronisch, Time for Another Look at Alternative U.N. Revenue, 147 N.J.L.J. 23 
(1997). “Like any tax collected by states, it could remain with the governments that collect it, whether 
for national programs, for dedication to international assessments, or for distribution as tax relief to the 
citizenry. Alternatively, those governments could take a fixed share and forward a specified 
percentage, or the entire net amount, after deducting national administrative costs, to the U.N.” Id. 
Interestingly, the author proposes that the U.N. consider accepting tax proceeds not as a tool to fund 
develo ping countries but as a means of replacing funds the United States, as “the world’s No. 1 U.N. 
deadbeat,” has failed to pay. Id. See also Carrasco & Berg, supra note 9, at 744 (explaining that Tobin 
believed the tax would give countries greater control over their domestic policies by providing them 
both better control over the flow of capital into and out of their borders). 
 12. Some Tobin Tax proposals have provided for the proceeds to be used to fund other causes. 
See, e.g., Tax Legislation: DeFazio and Wellstone Push Resolution for Tobin Tax to Curb Currency 
Speculation, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 71, Apr. 12, 2000 [hereinafter DeFazio and Wellstone] 
(explaining a proposal in the U.S. Congress that would provide a Tobin-like tax, the proceeds of which 
would be used for both developing countries and environmental clean-up); Brow, supra note 5, at 377-
378 (describing former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s suggestion that the proceeds 
be used for peacekeeping and other functions of the United Nations). Most Tobin Tax proposals, 
however, provide for the proceeds to be used in efforts to aid developing nations, such as assisting 
development and alleviating poverty. See, e.g., Mumia, infra note 15. See also  Newbery, supra note 3. 
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international approval and cooperation. In addition, it fails to present a 
solution to the problem of enforceability. The second approach uses an 
international agreement whereby countries implement the tax on a domestic 
level and contribute the proceeds to the international community. 
Part III will set forth a recommendation that adopts the second alternative, 
an international agreement between countries to collect the Tobin Tax 
domestically and remit the proceeds to the international organization 
responsible for distributing them. Implementation of the Tobin Tax at a 
domestic level would have several advantages, including the ability to utilize 
existing tax collection systems within individual countries that make use of 
advanced technology and experience, thereby reducing the overall cost of 
implementation. In addition, domestic implementation would enable 
individual countries to maintain sovereignty over the taxation of their foreign 
exchange markets. Countries could minimize the burden of implementing the 
tax by offsetting the cost of administration against tax proceeds prior to 
distribution to the governing international organization. Finally, because an 
international agreement requires international cooperation and the 
participation of key countries, a few of which have expressed initial 
opposition to the Tobin Tax, the proposal would limit the required number of 
participating countries. At the same time, it would provide countries with an 
incentive to implement the Tobin Tax by allowing them to reduce or 
eliminate their foreign aid obligations, thereby reducing the burden of 
international efforts and financial obligations on national governments. 
 
II. HISTORY  
A. Plight of Developing Countries 
Developing countries face myriad challenges. The governments must 
often deal with numerous overwhelming social problems, including disease, 
malnutrition, and rampant unemployment,13 as well as unstable governments, 
financial constraints, weak infrastructures, and lack of technology and 
technological expertise.14 With few financial resources, developing countries 
 
 
 13. Nancy S. Zahedi, Implementing the Rotterdam Convention: The Challenges of Transforming 
Aspirational Goals into Effective Controls on Hazardous Pesticides Exports to Developing Countries, 
11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 712 (1999). See also Margaret Legum, Tax Polluters To Raise 
Money for a General Income Grant, BUSINESS DAY (South Africa), Mar. 14, 2000, available at 
http://www.bday.co.za/bday/content/direct/1,3523,578574-6078-0,00.html (explaining that poverty is 
the beginning of a path to the destruction of society and results in “abuse of women and children, 
crime, delinquency, drugs and madness”). 
 14. Christine Batruch, “Hot Air” as Precedent for Developing Countries? Equity Considerations, 
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must rely on the international community for assistance in overcoming such 
tremendous obstacles.  
While developing countries make up a substantial portion of the 
international community, dominance by industrialized nations 15 is clearly 
evidenced by the international community’s failure to address, adequately 
consider, or resolve the problems facing developing countries.16 International 
agreements are a means by which the international community may articulate 
its concerns and establish common goals and policies.17 However, 
international agreements may overlook the needs of developing countries or 
address them without the participation of the developing countries 
themselves, thereby disproportionately reflecting the needs and views of 
industrialized countries.18 Even if given the opportunity, developing 
 
 
17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & P OL’Y 45, 58-59 (1998–99). 
 15. As one commentator has noted, 
[T]o whom will national economic policymakers be accountable? The implicit answer provided 
by the globalization model is that they will be accountable to foreign investors, country fund 
managers in London and New York, and a relatively small group of domestic exporters. In the 
globalized economy, these are the groups that determine whether an economy is judged a success 
or not, and whether it  will prosper . . . . 
[A finance minister in a developing country] is spending the vast majority of his time worrying 
about how the rest of the world evaluates his management of the economy. Traditional 
developmental concerns have been all but squeezed out . For this minister, it is global markets that 
dictate policy, not domestic priorities. 
 . . . .  
International markets, particularly financial ones, do not always get things right with respect to 
economic efficiency. They are even less likely to get things right with regard to societal outcomes 
suitable to each nation’s aspirations.  
Rodrik, supra  note 7, at 150-52 (1999). See also Pauline Mumia, Ecumenical Team Calls for a Just 
and Moral Economy, ALL AFRICA  NEWS AGENCY , Apr. 17, 2000, available at http://www.una.dk/ 
ffd/South_ngo/Godkendt_syd/allAf_Moral_Economy.htm (describing the belief of some 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that the steady rise in poverty throughout the 1990s indicates 
the “neo-liberal” free market economy has not benefited developing countries but instead has widened 
the gap between rich and poor). 
 16. See, e.g., supra  note 2. 
 17. Agreements, such as treaties and conventions, have proven to be more useful in international 
law because they are more reliable than customary law. C. Russell H. Shearer, International 
Environmental Law and Development in Developing Nations: Agenda Setting, Articulation, and 
Institutional Participation, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 391, 419 (1994). 
 18. Some commentators claim that the IMF and the World Bank ignore arguments that markets 
must be “socially embedded” in order for market reform measures to effectively promote economic 
development. Zalewski, supra note 2, at 242.  As a result, the institutions’ attempts to force economic 
policies on developing countries in exchange for financial assistance are often economically and 
socially disruptive. Id. See also Bing Ling, Developing Countries and Ozone Layer Protection: Issues, 
Principles and Implications, 6 TUL.  ENVTL. L.J. 91, 96 (1992) (explaining that, in the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, developing countries did not become involved 
in the process until after the agenda and general issues had been discussed and, as a result, most 
developing countries were not satisfied with the Protocol’s provisions regarding assistance to and 
obligations of developing countries); Shearer, supra note 17, at 416 (contending that “international 
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countries often have insufficient financial resources to participate in the 
mechanisms and organizations established by international agreements.19  
In addition to general goal and policy setting, international agreements 
often impose substantial regulations on member countries. Developing 
countries frequently find compliance with such standards and regulations 
prohibitively costly.20 They also complain that industrialized countries place 
the increasingly costly burden of international regulation on developing 
countries, while providing insufficient assistance to enable the developing 
countries to bear this burden.21 Although some international organizations 
 
 
institutions do not allow for greater input from developing nations to compensate for dominance 
exerted by developed nations in agenda setting and international law articulation”).  
 There is an inevitable tension between the democratic ideal of universal participation and the 
need for speedy, efficient decision-making, as well as between the respective claims of statehood, 
population, and wealth. The tension has increased as the number of states has grown while global 
economic decision-making, far from reflecting a polycentric world, has become concentrated in 
the hands of the United States, Europe, and Japan—with just over 10 per cent of the world’s 
population. 
 This concentration of decision-making is reflected in the voting arrangements of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. Even more important, it is also a factor in the exclusivity of such groups as the 
G7. And major powers dominate the negotiating processes of GATT, where all parties are 
nominally equal but actually very unequal. The countries that benefit from these inequalities 
would never accept such undemocratic arrangements in their own societies, and, in part at least, 
their economic strength derives from that rejection. 
Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood at Chapter Four: Managing 
Economic Interdependence, at http://www.cgg.ch/contents.htm (the article further explains that global 
governance should provide, inter alia , “systemic financial stability: a stable monetary system, a 
capacity to deal with major systemic slumps and shocks, and prudential regulation of international 
financial markets”). 
 19. The Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol sought to amend the Montreal 
Protocol in order to provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries in order to 
enable them to participate in the Protocol regime. Ling, supra note 18, at 97. In order to effectively 
participate in the development of international agreements, developing countries must obtain financing 
to enable their nat ional representatives to attend and participate in meetings of international 
organizations. These costs are distinguishable from the often significant costs developing countries 
must incur to comply with the standards established by the international agreement, such as the 
expense of implementing environmental protection programs. See infra note 21. See also  Ling, supra 
note 18, at 112. 
 20. “Opponents of environmental countervailing duties also argue that developing countries 
cannot afford to meet the environmental laws of the developed world, and thus, the imposition of 
countervailing duties against their products would freeze them out of world markets.” Robert F. 
Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforcing: 
Forging Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENVTL. L. 545, 558 (1993).  
 21. Zahedi, supra note 13. For example, approximately half of the developing signatories of the 
Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade had insufficient financial resources to adhere to the convention’s obligations of 
adopting pesticide control legislation, implementing it, and establishing the agencies necessary to 
enforce it. Id. at 712. Nearly eighty-four percent believed they would not be able to meet the 
international standards because of economic restraints. Id. See generally William Wilson, 
Environmental Law as Development Assistance, 22 ENVTL. L. 953 (1992). 
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have sought to provide quantitative assistance, the largest and most 
influential organizations have failed to meet their financial assistance goals.22  
B. Development of the Tobin Tax 
The unfettered flow of capital is a fundamental principle in most 
agreements affecting the international economy.23 However, it has wreaked 
havoc on currency rates and adversely affected national economies 
worldwide.24 As one commentator explains, “We can imagine cases in which 
judicious application of capital controls could have prevented a crisis or 
greatly reduced its magnitude.”25 As a result, many economists recommend 
restraints on such damaging market activity as short-term currency 
speculation.26 James Tobin conceived his tax for this purpose.  
The imposition of a tax on financial transactions in order to counteract the 
 
 
 22.  “Few rich countries have reached the agreed UN aid target for overseas aid budgets.” 
Barnes, supra note 2. The Trust Fund established by the Swedish International Development Authority 
and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) assists developing countries on 
technical and legal issues arising in environmental legislation. Wilson, supra note 21, at 969-70. 
During its first two years in existence, thirteen developing nations requested assistance. Id. at 970. The 
World Bank, on the other hand, has established goals and policies but has yet to implement them. Id. at 
968-69. Similarly, while the United Nations’ Agenda 21, which included what was hoped to be an 
effective mechanism whereby developing countries would receive funds to enforce international 
regulations, was only mildly successful due to a lack of enforcement of countries’ financial 
commitments. United Nations: More Action Said Needed to Blend Environmental Protection, 
Development, INT’L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA) at D-3, June 2, 1994, available at LEXIS, News Library.  
 23.  This trend appears to be changing. Originally established by the Bretton Woods system, the 
IMF’s primary purpose is to stabilize currency. Brow, supra note 5, at 350. “Indeed, even the IMF—
historically a vocal proponent of completely unfettered capital markets—has supported the limited use 
of taxes and restrictions on some international financial transactions.” William R. White, Note, The 
Tobin Tax: A Solution to Today’s International Monetary Instability?, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
365, 388.  
 24.  Rampersad, supra note 1. “‘[I]nternational [financial] turmoil is wreaking havoc in all 
emerging markets. It threatens the social and economic progress achieved in the last decade and the 
political consensus for greater economic and financial progress, which underpins the progress.’” Id. at 
116 (quoting Inter-American Development Bank, Introduction to the Seminar “New Initiatives to 
Tackle International Financial Turmoil,” Paris France (Mar. 14, 1999)). 
 25.  RODRIK, supra note 7, at 149. 
 26.  Zalewski, supra note 2, at 243 (explaining that some commentators believe “increased 
financial volatility has been a contributing factor to economic stagnation since the early 1970s”). See 
also What Does That Mean  . . . “Tobin-tax”?, DRESDNER BANK  TRENDS, June 1, 1999 (suggesting the 
Tobin tax could be used for short -term stabilization but should not replace other monetary reform 
measures); White, supra note 23, at 367 (claiming the IMF “has acknowledged that volatility in 
international currency markets can lead to decreased levels of transnational investment and trade, 
harming the world economy”); Commission on Global Governance, supra note 18 (calling for 
reformation of the IMF and describing how the current international monetary system is flexible but 
unstable while alternatives, such as governmental regulation and fixed exchange rates, are stable but 
inflexible). 
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disruptive effects of instability in the international market is not a new idea.27 
In the 1970s, James Tobin introduced an important variation on the theme. 
He recommended the imposition of a tax on international capital flows that 
would not merely allow individual countries to mitigate the impact of 
economic instability on domestic economies but would actually reduce 
instability at an international level. 28 While the tax would be imposed on all 
international transactions, its low rate and repeated application to transactions 
that have brief turnaround times29 would reduce the incentive to invest in 
destructive short-term currency speculation while having a minimal, 
potentially immaterial effect on long-term capital flows.30 Early in 2000, 
Canada revived the international community’s interest in the Tobin Tax 
when it recommended that the United Nations perform a study on the tax’s 
advantages and disadvantages.31 
 
 
 27.  Retarding Short-Term Capital Flows Through Withholding Tax, IMF Fiscal Affairs 
Department, Working Paper 3 (2000) [hereinafter IMF Working Paper]. In the 1930s, Keynes 
introduced a tax on financial transactions that was designed to “discourage speculative activities which 
are not in line with economic fundamentals.” Id.  
 28.  Id. at 4. The goals of taxes proposed by Keynes and Tobin are fundamentally different 
because the former is intended to “merely moderate the impact of volatile world capital flows on a 
country’s domestic economy” whereas the latter is “aimed at reducing global destabilizing speculative 
capital movements.” Id. This Recent Development explains that the Tobin tax’s broader goal makes it 
more susceptible to the problems of international cooperation and enforceability than Keynes’ 
domestic tax. Id. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
 29.  The transaction cost of the tax on short -term transactions would be double the tax rate 
because it would be imposed both at the time the currency was purchased and at the time it was sold. 
This Week: Finance: The Tobin Tax: A Strategy Against Currency Speculation, BUSINESSWORLD 
(Philippines), July 5, 1999 [hereinafter “BusinessWorld”]. As a result, the “double taxation” would be 
prohibitively costly for short term currency transactions wherein profit arises from very small currency 
price differentials. Id. But see infra note 33. 
 30.  “While the rate would be low enough not to have a significant effect on longer-term 
investment where yield is higher, it would cut into the yields of speculators moving massive amounts 
of currency around the globe as they seek to profit from minute differentials in currency fluctuations.” 
Kenety, supra note 3. Paul Bernd Spahn, a German economist, proposes a two-tiered variation of the 
Tobin Tax that would impose a uniform low tax rate on all currency transactions with an additional 
surcharge to be imposed on transactions during periods of exchange rate turbulence. Id. See 
DRESDNER BANK TRENDS, supra note 26, for a hypothetical demonstrating how the Tobin tax is more 
effective when applied to transactions that have shorter maturities. 
 31.  Catherine Rama, “Tobin Tax” Study Proposed for UN Social Summit Final Text, AGENCE 
FRANCE  PRESSE, June 29, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library. “[A] majority of UN member 
states [sic] supports the idea of a study, as do NGOs, trade union, and parliamentarians.” Kenety, 
supra note 3. Only three countries, including the United States and Australia, initially opposed 
Canada’s proposal. Geoffrey Barker, UN-Friendly, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., July 17, 2000, available 
at http://www.comp.utas.edu.au/units/kxa155/rkyv/FR0/FR0J1/FR0J117a.htm [hereinafter “UN-
Friendly”]. The opponents’ primary concern appeared to be the inclusion of the term “Tobin tax,” 
which was ultimately removed by agreement between the United States and Canada. Id.   
[T]he director of the UN’s social policy and development division . . . described [the US-Canada 
agreement on] the communique as an ‘astonishing breakthrough,’ saying it meant ‘there is to be a 
study authorised without dissent by the member countries of the UN into a currency transaction 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/8
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1. Advantages 
As Tobin intended, the primary advantage of the Tobin tax would be the 
reduction of currency speculation, resulting in increased foreign exchange 
market stability.32 An important advantage of the Tobin Tax is that it may be 
 
 
tax, the Tobin tax, and other potential sources of revenue for social development.  
Id. See Kenety, supra note 3 (explaining that Japan is the third opponent of Canada’s proposal). There 
is insufficient information to determine Japan’s rationale for opposing Canada’s proposal. See infra 
note 39. But see Geoffrey Barker, UN To Pursue Study of Tobin Tax, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., July 4, 
2000 (contending that Japan’s opposition wavered). While Canada’s proposal was ultimately adopted 
without dissent, some commentators warn that the U.N.’s omission of the term “Tobin Tax,” as 
negotiated by the United States, suggests the final agreement was not supportive of a Tobin Tax. Paul 
Robilliard, Tobin Currency Tax Is Not The Answer, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., July 21, 2000. 
 32.  For Its Own Protection, The World Needs the Tobin Tax, THE GLOBE AND  MAIL, Mar. 16, 
1999, available at http://www.halifaxinitative.org/hi.php/Tobin/77 (reciting a letter to the Canadian 
legislature “signed by some 40 professors of economics and other disciplines, and by representatives 
of some 45 non-governmental organizations”). In the letter, the writers recognized the tax’s potential 
weaknesses. “The Tobin tax will not stop all speculative activity; in fact, it was never designed to. The 
tax will be avoided to a certain extent, as all taxes are. Technical and administrative challenges to 
implementation exist, but are clearly outweighed by the cost of the status quo and are not 
insurmountable.” Id. Some economists contend that, contrary to expectations, a tax on financial 
transactions will not reduce currency speculation and, consequently, will have no impact on economic 
instability. “The idea [of a Tobin Tax] was . . . dismissed as ‘stupid’ by 1999 Nobel economics 
laureate Robert Mundell who has said it would not reduce speculation.” Curb Speculators, supra note 
42. See also Paul Davidson, The Tobin Tax: Coping with Financial Volatility, E. ECON. J. 105 (Jan. 1, 
2000) (contending that transactions costs on international financial transactions are independent of 
time and thus have a negligible impact on short-term currency speculation). But see White, supra note 
23, at 369 (contending that, while portfolio theory suggests firms should be risk-neutral to exchange 
rate risk, the reality is that  firms are affected by exchange rate risk). “[E]xcess volatility will decrease 
aggregate transnational investment levels and overall economic growth, and interventions in the 
[foreign exchange] market may be justified.” Id. See also Brow, supra note 5, at 393-94 (explaining 
that some studies indicate decreased turnover in transactions “inevitably” decreases volatility and 
commentators question other studies that have resulted in contrary findings). Others argue that while a 
tax can reduce currency speculation, this particular tax will not because of the low proposed tax rate.  
[C]ritics of the Tobin proposal point out that in the ‘emerging market’ world of extremely high 
currency risks, investors who expect a short-term devaluation of as little as three or four percent 
would not be deterred from a speculative transaction by a Tobin tax set at 0.1 to 0.5 percent. 
 Indeed, given the scale of recent ‘emerging market’ devaluations (50 percent in Thailand and 
Indonesia, 40 percent in Br azil) the tax would be totally irrelevant.  
Kenety, supra note 3 (explaining that, despite this argument, critics admit that “the Tobin tax would 
reduce pre-crisis speculative short-term flows and thus help avoid the problem of overvalued exchange 
rates in the first place”). But see White, supra note 23, at 390 (contending that, given the fact that more 
than 80% of foreign exchange transactions are very short term in nature, extending over seven days or 
less, a tax even as low as .1% could severely curtail the vast majority of speculative currency 
transactions). Finally, some critics argue that the tax will not be effective because traders may simply 
create derivative instruments to avoid taxation. Brow, supra note 5, at 392.  
Contrary to criticism, traders may not be able to escape the tax by inventing some type of financial 
instrument. First, most derivatives will be covered by a Tobin Tax because foreign gains and 
losses on derivatives are already reported under [U.S. tax law]. As for more sophisticated 
derivatives, James Tobin points out that the more removed an instrument becomes from the 
underlying exchange, the greater the transaction costs. This means, if traders use ultra-exotic 
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imposed with little or no impact on long-term investments.33 Thus, while the 
short-term currency speculation market segment is intentionally slowed, the 
rest of the market remains free to operate virtually without restraint.34 
The Tobin Tax has several other advantages, the most obvious of which is 
the ability to raise a tremendous amount of money.35 Though Tobin initially 
conceived of the tax as a means of reducing destructive instability in the 
currency market, the primary side effect of the tax, its tax proceeds, is 
undeniably attractive. In addition to the tax proceeds, another advantage is 
the international community’s general acceptance of such a potentially 
controversial tax.36 While there will always be commentators and legislators 
 
 
derivatives to avoid a Tobin tax, at some point, the cost of evading the tax will exceed the tax 
itself. 
Id. at 397. 
 33.  See, e.g., IMF Working Paper, supra note 27, at 3 (explaining that the basis for Keynes’s 
proposal was that a tax on financial transactions would encourage long-term currency transactions and 
discourage speculative ones).  
The implied transaction cost inflicted by the [Tobin] tax, even if imposed at a very low nominal 
rate (say, 1 percent or lower), would be hefty on transactions with a short turn-around time, but 
would diminish rapidly as their time horizon lengthens. Hence, the Tobin tax appears to be a neat 
instrument to cool the heels of volatile cross-country speculative capital movements, which 
invariably have a short time horizon, without at the same time damaging longer-term international 
capital flows, which presumably are primarily influenced by economic fundamentals.  
Id. 
 34.   
[With the imposition of a Tobin Tax], market institutions would be geared to help those who 
would otherwise be left behind. Clearly, then, [the Tobin Tax aims] not to arrest globalization but 
to ensure that it is more just and that its benefits are more widely shared that they would be under 
a laissez-faire regime. 
Mandle, supra note 1, at 134 (explaining that the Tobin Tax would minimize any adverse impacts on 
globalization by working with the market rather than replacing it).  
 35.  As with the volume of international currency transactions and the amount of the tax itself, 
the possible amount of proceeds generally varies from $50 to $300 billion annually. U.S., French, 
European Lawmakers, supra note 9. See also Newbery, supra note 3 (explaining that, with proceeds 
potentially in excess of $250 billion per year, proceeds could be “five times more than the world 
currently spends on aid and . . . would pay off all international debt within eight months”). 
Commentators argue that these figures do not account for the reduction in international currency 
transactions that would likely result from the imposition of the tax. White, supra note 23, at 391-92 
(noting that “[m]ore recent projections are far more conservative and arrive at annual estimates in the 
$100 billion range, depending on the tax rate levied,” but the figure may be as low as $40 billion if the 
tax caused a change in the fundamental structure of the currency market). 
 36.  See AFX European Press Summary—Monday, AFX NEWS, July 3, 2000, available at 
LEXIS, News Library (indicating Denmark’s prime minister supports a Tobin Tax); Call for Tax on 
Currency Speculation, BRISTOL EVENING POST, Jan. 21, 2000, available at LEXIS News Library 
(summarizing a view of a proponent within the United Kingdom legislature); Ray Martin, Canada 
Leads Fight on Tax Speculation, THE EDMONTON SUN, Apr. 7, 1999, available at 
www.halifaxinitiative.org/hi.php/Tobin/76 (mentioning Canadian legislative efforts to support a Tobin 
Tax); Elisabeth Winkler, Earthmother,  BRISTOL EVENING POST, Mar. 25, 2000, available at LEXIS, 
News Library (noting the United Kingdom’s rising movement in support of a Tobin Tax); supra note 
31 (examining the international support for and critics of Canada’s proposal). Supporters include 
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who deem taxes to be inherently undesirable,37 some argue that reasonable 
taxes are acceptable and may be desirable as components of developing 
countries’ domestic policies.38 Similarly, some commentators contend that 
domestic taxes, or lack thereof through investment-encouraging tax 
incentives, bear little or no impact on the decision-making process of 
corporations engaging in long-term projects.39  
2. Disadvantages 
The Tobin Tax has several disadvantages. As with other cooperative 
international efforts,40 a few large industrialized nations, especially the 
 
 
NGOs, such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens 
(ATTAC), which has local associations in Europe, Africa, and North and South America. Tobin Tax 
Lobby Goes onto the ATTAC, AGENCE  FRANCE PRESSE , June 29, 2000, available at LEXIS, News 
Library [hereinafter “ATTAC”]. See also World Council of Churches Say the Special Session in 
Geneva Will Not Alleviate Problems of Poor Countries, PAC. ISLANDS BROADCASTING ASS’N NEWS 
SERVICE , June 26, 2000. See also supra notes 31-32. See also Worthy Crusade Quotes, THE 
WORLDPAPER, Dec. 1, 1999 (quoting Barber Conable, former president of the World Bank as calling 
the Tobin tax “‘one of the most intriguing potential ways to stabilize UN financing without damaging 
sovereignty or distorting market flows’”); BUSINESSWORLD, supra note 29 (indicating the IMF has 
moved from opposition to unofficial support for the Tobin Tax since the international currency crises 
took place).  
 37.  See Barnett, supra note 9 (reciting a member of the Cato Institute’s belief that “the tax runs 
counter to U.S. notions about freedom of capital”). But see infra note 38. 
 38.  “Some consensus exists on what constitutes a reasonable trade strategy for African countries 
. . . do replace quantitative restrictions with tariffs; do avoid extreme variations in tariff rates . . .  don’t 
tax export crops too highly. Provided that the qualifiers in this list of guidelines (‘extreme,’ 
‘excessively high,’ etc.) are interpreted reasonably, these desiderata remain useful.” RODRIK, supra 
note 7, at 130.  
39.  Although many developing countries have introduced far-reaching fiscal incentives for 
inward investment—tax holidays, supported by accelerated depreciation allowances and 
investment allowances or subsidies—surveys suggest they are of modest importance influencing 
investment decisions in general. Businessmen appear to regard them as of limited significance for 
the post-tax profitability of new investments in relation to other influences . . . 
Vincent Cable & Bisnodat Persaud, New Trends and Policy Problems in Foreign Investment: The 
Experience of Commonwealth Developing Countries, in DEVELOPING WITH  FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1, 
10-11 (Vincent Cable & Bishnodat Persaud, eds., 1987). See, e.g., Sheila Page, Developing Country 
Attitudes Towards Foreign Investment, in DEVELOPING WITH FOREIGN INVESTMENT 28, 41 (Vincent 
Cable & Bishnodat Persaud eds., 1987) (contending that tax incentives have limited impact on 
investment decision making); Roger C. Riddell, Zimbabwe’s Experience of Foreign Investment Policy, 
in DEVELOPING WITH FOREIGN INVESTMENT 280, 297 (Vincent Cable & Boshnodat Persaud eds., 
1987) (explaining that high corporate tax rates in Zimbabwe are a factor in investment decision 
making, but are “not a dominant deterrent”).  
 40.  Western legislators and academics oft en complain that international agreements treat 
developing countries preferentially by allowing them to meet less stringent requirements and 
contribute fewer financial resources to the regulatory regimes. Sean Michael Neal, Bringing 
Developing Nations on Board the Climate Change Protocol: Using Debt-For-Nature Swaps to 
Implement the Clean Development Mechanism, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.  L. REV. 163, 167 (1998) 
(explaining legislators and academics disagreed with the Kyoto Climate Change Protocol’s nonbinding 
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United States,41 are the most vocal opponents of the Tobin Tax.42 Critics 
 
 
obligations on developing countries). The sentiment has found approval in U.S. politics. “The U.S. 
Senate has already expressed its disapproval of the protocol due, in large part, to the lack of support 
from developing countries.” Id. at 168. Likewise, “[t]he Clinton Administration has responded to these 
criticisms by promising to push for support from developing nations.” Id.  
 41.  The United States argues that the United Nations is not entitled to tax its member nations. 
Rama, supra note 31. See also Kenety, supra note 3 (explaining that “US senator Jesse Helms 
vehemently [opposes] . . . what he derides as a ‘UN tax’”). The United States was the primary 
opponent of Canada’s proposal to study the tax, which was supported by around forty NGOs. Rama, 
supra note 31. The United States initially opposed Canada’s proposal because “the UN and its 
agencies are not mandated to tax member nations.” Id. This argument may have some merit. In 
proposing the establishment of an apex body within the United Nations, the Commission on Global 
Governance emphasized the fact that it does not propose introducing a “taxing power” within the U.N. 
system. Commission on Global Governance, supra note 18. “User charges, levies, taxes—global 
revenue—receiving arrangements of whatever kind—have to be agreed globally and implemented by a 
treaty or convention.” Id. However, the United States ultimately showed a willingness to cooperat e 
when Canada agreed to exclude the specific “Tobin tax” name from its proposal. UN-friendly, supra 
note 31. Australia likewise appeared somewhat more willing to cooperate when the proposal excluded 
the “Tobin tax” language, calling the U.S.-Canadian agreement ‘very satisfactory.’ Id. See also 
Kronisch, supra note 11 (arguing that, in addition to having no authority to levy taxes, the United 
Nations has no means of collecting them). Despite overall opposition to the tax, the legislature of the 
United States includes some supporters of the Tobin Tax. In April of 2000, a concurrent resolution was 
introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives that supported a domestic tax on cross-
border, short-term currency transactions. DeFazio and Wellstone, supra note 12. DeFazio explains that 
the tax is designed to prevent excessive currency speculation. “‘Although Wall Street barons may 
think this country is isolated from international financial crises, the U.S. is not immune . . . . It is only 
a matter of time before Americans will feel the effect of the financial devastation in other parts of the 
world.’” Id. (quoting Rep. Peter DeFazio). See also Brow, supra note 5, at 351-52 (examining 
currency problems the United States has faced in the past, including the reduction in the U.S. trade 
balance, the increase in U.S. overseas liabilities, and the insufficiency of U.S. gold reserves that 
prompted American leaders to change the U.S. currency from the gold-standard to a free-floating 
currency in the early 1970s). 
 42.  Kenety, supra note 3. Japan is also opposed to the Tobin Tax, but there is little information 
available on the Japanese government’s views or rationale. Id. Australia is also a vocal opponent to the 
tax. Id. However, rather than indicating a substantive reason for its opposition, Australia’s position 
seems to reflect a general unwillingness to cooperate with efforts of the United Nations.  
 Australia’s active hostility to an entirely non-binding UN study of the Tobin tax (and there 
are serious arguments for and against it) reflected the Federal Government’s increasingly 
aggressive and dismissive attitude toward [the] United Nations . . . . 
  . . . .  
 The Tobin tax issue reflected [the Australian government’s] antipathy to international 
economic initiatives by UN social policy bodies . . . .  
UN-Friendly, supra note 31. But cf. Ernest Rodeck, Tobin Tax May Be Way Out of Financial Ruin, 
AUSTRALASIAN BUS. INTELLIGENCE: THE AGE, Oct. 25, 1999 (arguing that Australia should support 
the Tobin Tax because it would protect Australia’s currency and thus would be in Australia’s best 
interests). France’s views have changed over time. The current administration, particularly Finance 
Minister Laurent Fabius, seemingly disapproves of the Tobin tax because of “practical difficulties” 
and “difficulties over what to do with the money collected.” France Backs Off Tobin Tax To Curb 
Speculators, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 22, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter 
“Curb Speculators”]. See France’s Fabius Sees No Need for ECB Rate Increase, DOW JONES INT’L 
NEWS, July 8, 2000 (recounting Fabius’s claim that “European finance ministers are hostile to any 
shift in policy that might cause Europe’s young economic recovery to fade” and “most governments 
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argue that a tax on international transactions will increase transaction costs, 
thereby acting as a barrier to investment.43 Another argument against the 
Tobin Tax is that it will adversely affect the foreign exchange market itself. 
For example, the tax could create economic distortion by failing to 
distinguish between beneficial, long-term financial transactions and 
detrimental, short-term speculative transactions.44 Some commentators argue 
that any intervention in the market would cause market inefficiencies.45 
Others disagree, however, claiming the foreign exchange market is not 
currently efficient and would therefore benefit from a reduction in exchange 
rate instability, such as would be effected through the imposition of the 
Tobin Tax.46 One commentator explains that, with implementation of the 
 
 
and international financial institutions are hostile to [the Tobin Tax]”); Keeping the Tobin Tax Away, 
WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJE 21069004 (elucidating Fabius’s views 
as opposing the tax but praising its proponents); BoF’s Trichet “Very Much Opposed” to Tobin Tax, 
DOW JONES INT’L NEWS, June 29, 2000 (discussing the Bank of France Governor’s opposition to the 
Tobin Tax). But see supra note 36 (addressing support for the Tobin Tax within the international 
community, including the European Union); French Prime Minister Jospin Proposes Multilateral 
Discussion on Tobin Tax Idea, INT’L TAXES (BNA) No. 130 (July 6, 2000) (explaining that Fabius 
“unveiled France’s newfound interest in the Tobin Tax June 28 during an address before the National 
Assembly . . . noting that it was the perfect meeting of two ideas: the need to fight poverty and 
underdevelopment and the need to better regulate global capitalism”); Allister Heath, False Dawn: 
France Is Not Back, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 6, 2000, 2000 WL-WSJE 21065649 (showing a split of 
opinion within the French government).  
 43.  See also Newbery, supra note 3 (claiming that NGOs that promote the Tobin Tax, such as 
War on Want, face criticism that the tax will discourage international investment and trade).  
The NGO defends the tax by explaining that ‘[u]p to 40 per cent of current trade takes the form of 
the shipment of goods between the branches of transnational corporations financed by 
bookkeeping entries, rather than conversion of one currency into another. Therefore most of these 
transactions are not even liable to the tax . . . . 
 In fact, trade would most likely be boosted by a Tobin Tax as greater confidence in exchange 
rate levels would allow better planning and forecasting of trade transactions[.]’ 
Id. (quoting War on Want spokesman St eve Tibbett). See also Brow, supra note 5, at 397 (explaining 
that “[t]he Bretton Woods Commission concluded that the current system of floating exchange rates is 
responsible for lower economic growth rates around the world”); White, supra note 23, at 387 
(demonstrating, inter alia, firms engaging in international investment would benefit from a reduction 
of exchange rate risk).  
 44.  Is the Tobin Tax Impracticable?, LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, June 2, 2000 (explaining that some 
legislators are concerned that the tax is impracticable because “it hasn’t the means to distinguish 
speculative fluxes from non-speculative ones”). IMF Working Paper, supra note 27, at 5. The IMF 
admits that this argument is valid not only for the Tobin Tax but also for unilateral measures, such as 
domestic taxes on financial transactions flowing in and out of a particular country. Id. The IMF 
counters this argument by balancing the relative cost of the economic distortion against the cost of 
instability within the foreign exchange market. Id. The IMF further contends that, combined with the 
low administrative costs of implementing the tax with the use of existing domestic systems, any 
economic distortions creat ed by the tax would be “largely mitigated.” Id. See supra note 33 for a 
discussion of tax’s impact on long-term transactions. 
 45.  White, supra note 23, at 368. 
 46.  Davidson, supra note 32 (explaining that some economists argue that the Tobin tax is an 
excellent tool to overcome exchange rate misalignment that occurs from the asymmetric information 
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Tobin Tax, “[t]he market will still determine exchange rates; it will just do so 
more efficiently than it presently does.”47 
While the controversial tax sparked much debate over the proper balance 
between free market economics and social need, the most critical argument 
in opposition of the tax is enforceability. If the Tobin Tax is implemented at 
an international level, which international organization would monitor 
international currency transactions? How could this organization assess and 
collect the tax and how effective would it be?48 Given the role of technology 
in effectuating transactions in the foreign exchange market, establishing a 
new international organization or preparing an existing one to enforce the tax 
would be both technically challenging and costly.49 Alternatively, individual 
countries could implement and enforce the tax at the domestic level and send 
the proceeds to an international organization for distribution.50 Under this 
approach, there are three primary cha llenges to enforcement. First, countries 
will have a strong incentive to refuse to comply with an international 
agreement implementing the tax in order to attract investors who are 
unwilling to pay the tax.51 Second, assuming countries do comply, what 
international organization would enforce the countries’ obligation to part 
 
 
available in the foreign exchange market). “[E]mpirical studies evaluating the forward foreign 
exchange market cast doubt on the [foreign exchange] market’s overall efficiency. Specifically, 
research into the use of forward exchange rates as a predicter of future “spot” rates indicated that 
forward premiums are systematically biased and predict changes in the future spot rate that are in the 
opposite direction of those actually observed.” White, supra note 23, at 373. See also Brow, supra note 
5, at 360 (explaining that some theorists believe foreign exchange market distortion is caused by 
currency speculation). 
 47.  Brow, supra note 5, at 395 (contending that the foreign exchange market is currently 
distorted because of existing factors, such as noise traders). 
 48.  IMF Working Paper, supra note 27, at 3 (explaining that “the practical feasibility of the 
Tobin tax has been bedeviled by a host of economic, administrative, and political complexities . . . 
[because] proponents of the Tobin tax continue to stress that its application . . . must be universal and 
uniform to prevent leakage of any kind”). See also Brow, supra note 5, at 392 (contending that tax 
proposals by international organizations, such as the IMF, would “not [be] a realistic option” because 
of opposition by the United States). 
 49.  In order to be effective, mechanisms for assessing and collecting the tax would have to be 
both sophisticated and technologically advanced. See White, supra note 23, at 396-98 for a discussion 
of the securities regulatory process in which, as regulators become more sophisticated, traders would 
develop more exotic derivative instruments in an effort to avoid taxation. While the creation of a new 
international organization is costly in itself, providing it with the tools necessary to become a 
sophisticated and technologically advanced regulatory body could be prohibitively expensive. 
 50.  See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text. Cf. Brow, supra note 5, at 378-89 (examining 
tax treatment of currency transactions under U.S. law and comparing ways in which the tax could be 
implemented within the United States, such as at the market level through an excise tax or at the 
domestic level as a federal income tax). 
 51.  See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. “Experts have been divided about whether a 
reasonably watertight levy was possible on any terms. If the tax is not to be widely evaded, many think 
that all governments even the tax havens should cooperate.” The Tobin Tax for the Greater Global 
Good, WORLDPAPER, Dec. 1, 1999 [hereinafter “Worldpaper”]. 
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with the tax proceeds and how would it do so? Finally, the variety of 
locations where currency transactions take place make universal enforcement 
difficult if not impossible.52 
While the Tobin Tax has several advantages and disadvantages, one of 
the largest obstacles that may stand in the way of its adoption by the 
international community is the need for international cooperation. In order to 
impose a tax on international currency transactions, there must be widespread 
agreement on the terms of the tax.53 While most currency transactions take 
place in only a few countries and currencies,54 the tax would provide 
countries with an incentive to hold back approval on any international 
agreements implementing it.55 For example, if an international agreement on 
the Tobin Tax was widely adopted, currency traders could shift their 
transactions to those markets that did not impose the tax, thereby rewarding 
countries that did not bind themselves to the terms of the agreement.56  
 
 
 52.  “Currencies can be exchanged anywhere or nowhere. Parties may be thousands of miles 
apart and need not use bank deposits. Bonds or derivatives will serve. Tax exchanges in one place in 
one form, say skeptics, and they will surely shift to another.” Worldpaper, supra note 51. But see infra 
note 57. 
 53.  White, supra note 23, at 399-402. See also IMF Working Paper, supra note 27, at 3. 
 54.  See DeFazio and Wellstone, supra note 12 (explaining that the five countries with the most 
dominant currencies, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan, and 
Switzerland, must cooperate and support the Tobin Tax in order for it to be effective).  
 55.  White, supra note 23, at 399-402.  
 56.  Charlotte Denny, Tobin’s Tax Plan Finds Favour Only With the Finns: Economics Made 
Easy, GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library. It should be noted that this 
argument assumes the Tobin Tax will not be considered a part of binding, nonconsensual international 
law. But see Business: Tobin or not Tobin? Nice Idea, . . . But Out of the Question , OBSERVER, Sept. 5, 
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library (quoting a senior economist as saying, in response to the 
argument that countries could attract short -term currency traders by refusing to cooperate with 
international efforts to impose a Tobin tax, “Britain has sovereignty over most of the world’s tax 
havens. It could click its fingers and there would be nothing they could do about it”). It has also been 
asserted that  
[i]f major currency trading countries adopt the tax . . . the major foreign exchange markets and the 
major foreign exchange participants will be included within its scope. There is reason to doubt that 
trading will simply move offshore to a tax-free haven. For one thing, low-cost tax havens like the 
Cayman Islands have failed to attract most banking activ ity away from New York, London, and 
Tokyo. The cost of moving to such locations, including moving the technological infrastructure 
and, more importantly, the traders themselves, will be high . . . . Finally, the migratory impulse 
might not be so overwhelming. The United Kingdom and Japan both currently have security 
transaction taxes of 0.5% and 0.21% respectively, yet that fact has not affected their positions as 
global financial centers.  
Brow, supra note 5, at 396-97. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The Tobin Tax is an ideal tool to aid in the resolution of two very 
important and somewhat interrelated problems: instability in the international 
currency market and the needs of developing countries. Though it is not a 
perfect solution to the world’s problems, the advantages of the Tobin Tax far 
outweigh its disadvantages.57 As a result, the question should not be whether 
to adopt the Tobin Tax; it should merely be how to adopt it.  
One approach would be to create an international organization to 
implement and enforce the tax on an international level.58 The majority of 
currency transactions on which the Tobin Tax would be assessed take place 
within a few industrialized countries.59 While the purpose of the tax is to 
stabilize the foreign exchange market, the effect would be to shift wealth 
from a narrow portion of the economies of industrialized countries to the 
international community for application to worldwide problems, such as 
poverty. As a result, implementation of the Tobin Tax through an 
international organization would be symbolically consistent with the effect of 
the tax itself because it would require international cooperation and represent 
economic interdependence.60 
This approach has several advantages. An international organization 
would provide uniform implementation. As a result, countries would be 
assured that each member nation would receive comparable treatment, 
 
 
 57.  The Tobin Tax has several significant advantages. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39. 
While some critics believe that the Tobin Tax will have little or no effect on instability in the foreign 
exchange market, the consensus appears to be that the Tobin Tax will indeed reduce currency 
transactions. See supra notes 32, 44 and accompanying text.  
 While the Tobin Tax has several disadvantages, an effective implementation plan may reduce or 
eliminate many of them. For example, an implementation plan that effectively combines incentives to 
adopt the Tobin Tax with the means to enforce participating countries’ obligations would mitigate the 
problem of enforceability. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. Likewise, the use of 
incentives could encourage international cooperation. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 58.  Brow, supra note 5, at 377. One author suggests that an Economic Security Council could be 
developed to implement and enforce the Tobin Tax within the institutional framework of the United 
Nations, inter alia . Rampersad, supra note 1, at 121. An Economic Security Council, or ESC, was 
proposed in 1995 as an apex body within the United Nations. Commission on Global Governance, 
supra note 18. The ESC would operate similar to, but independent of, the U.N. Security Council and 
would focus on issues affecting the international economy. Id. While the current institution informally 
governing economic decision making, the G7, predominantly represents the interests of industrialized 
countries, the ESC would represent a wider constituency, including developing countries and countries 
with alternative economies, such as Communist countries. Id.  
 59.  See supra note 54. 
 60.  See Commission on Global Governance, supra note 18, at Chapter Four: Managing 
Economic Interdependence, for an examination of the impact of globalization on the international 
community, as well as industrialized and developin g countries individually, and the efforts of 
international and regional systems to cope with ensuing problems.  
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potentially motivating more countries to participate in the implementation of 
the tax. In addition, an organization operating under the auspices of a 
recognized international body, such as the United Nations or the World 
Bank, could utilize the larger organization’s established enforcement and 
dispute settlement mechanisms. Although this approach is traditionally 
favored by Tobin Tax proponents,61 it faces the potentially insurmountable 
obstacle of gaining widespread international approval and cooperation.62 In 
addition, it fails to present a solution to the problem of enforceability. Rather, 
it merely designates which organization will be responsible for solving the 
enforceability problem.  
The second approach is the use of national taxation systems to implement 
the tax at the domestic level.63 This approach could use national banking and 
taxation systems to track international financial transactions and 
subsequently assess and collect the tax.64 National governments would then 
contribute the proceeds to the international organization responsible for the 
distribution of the funds. Presumably, participating countries would only 
adopt this approach if they entered into a multilateral agreement with all 
other participating countries. Countries have a disincentive to implement the 
Tobin Tax unilaterally because imposition of the tax could put them at a 
competitive disadvantage.65 As a result, countries will not likely enter into an 
agreement to impose the tax on themselves without assurance that other 
countries are equally bound to impose the tax within their domestic foreign 
 
 
 61.  Rampersad, supra note 1, at 124. 
 62.  See supra note 41 (discussing critics’ arguments that the U.N. is not entitled to tax its 
members). If the tax were to be implemented by a body within the United Nations, implementation 
could face a constitutional hurdle because the United Nations lacks the power to tax its member 
nations. Rama, supra note 31. While garnering sufficient international cooperation to implement the 
Tobin Tax would be difficult, it may be impossible to achieve enough support to pass a proposal to 
grant the United Nations the “taxing power” necessary to implement a Tobin Tax agreement.  
 63.  IMF Working Paper, supra note 27, at 1 . In early 2000, the IMF proposed the imposition of 
a tax on financial transactions at the domestic level. Id. The IMF explains that the Tobin Tax is 
susceptible to three arguments: “[I]t would generate large economic distortions with respect to 
transactions unrelated to capital flows, require a high degree of international coordination in putting an 
effective enforcement mechanism in place, and raise very difficult issues about the disposal of the 
potentially large revenue from the tax.” Id. at 3. The article further asserts that the unilateral imposition 
of a domestic tax on financial transactions would minimize the impact of instability in the foreign 
exchange market on the domestic economy. The unilateral imposition of the domestic tax would 
eliminate the problems of enforcement, international cooperation, and revenue disposal that the Tobin 
Tax faces. Id. at 4. Implementation at the domestic level has garnered some support among NGOs as 
well. “War on Want recommends that the tax be instated through an international agreement, backed 
by national legislation and suggests that it be applied where the transactions occur or where the deal is 
made, making collection of the tax the responsibility of the national central bank.” Newbery, supra 
note 3. 
 64.  Worldpaper, supra note 51 (considering the suggestion made by Canadian Rodney Schmidt). 
 65.  See supra note 51. 
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exchange markets. Further, tax proceeds may be assessed and collected in a 
number of ways, such as reducing the total proceeds to be contributed to the 
international organization by the administrative costs incurred by the national 
government in implementing the tax.66 Countries will likely express concern 
that, without a multilateral agreement in which all of the parties have 
comparable obligations, some countries will receive better treatment than 
others.67  
There are several advantages to implementing the Tobin Tax at the 
domestic level. Such an approach would be cheaper than establishing an 
international organization because it would utilize institutions that are already 
in place.68 It would also be more effective because it would employ the skill, 
experience, and technological capabilities that already exist in many 
domestic systems. Therefore, assessment and collection of the tax would be 
easier, thereby reducing the possibility that investors could avoid the tax by 
developing derivative instruments.69 An additional benefit is that it would not 
necessarily require the universal cooperation that would be needed to 
implement the tax on an international level.70 While domestic 
implementation may be more practical, some argue that this approach is risky 
because governments that implement the tax may choose to keep the 
 
 
 66.  See Kronisch, supra note 11; supra text accompanying note 11. 
 67.  See infra note 74. 
 68.  IMF Working Paper, supra note 27, at 4-5. 
 69.  Worldpaper, supra note 51. “Because of the insistence on new technology that enables the 
simultaneous settling of two payments involved in any trade, recently developed institutions form a 
single network for settling nearly all foreign-exchange transactions.” Id. Thus, this approach addresses 
both the cooperative and technological aspects of enforcement of the Tobin Tax. See supra note 49. 
Practice within the United States provides an excellent example of the increased effectiveness of Tobin 
Tax enforcement through the use of domestic systems. The use of derivative instruments is 
commonplace within the stock market of the United States. See supra  note 32. See also  White, supra 
note 23. As a result, federal agencies that regulate the stock market and taxation likely have a great 
deal of experience with derivative instruments and may be better equipped to identify and monitor 
instruments that are being used to evade the tax. Supra note 32. Because some other countries, such as 
the United Kingdom and Japan, currently tax financial transactions, their domestic systems likely have 
enormous experience in monitoring and assessing and collecting taxes on derivative instruments. See 
supra note 56. 
 70.  Worldpaper, supra note 51. “Any government could impose and collect the tax on trade in 
its currency.” Id. Because the majority of currency transactions take place in only a few countries, an 
agreement to implement the Tobin Tax would arguably only require ratification by those countries in 
order to fulfill the tax’s dual purposes of stabilizing the foreign exchange market and raising proceeds 
to aid developing countries. See supra note 54. If only a few industrialized countries ratify a 
multilateral agreement, however, they would be as guilty of legislating issues affecting developing 
countries without the actual participation of developing countries as other existing international 
agreements. See supra notes 18-19. In addition, if the international organization involved in collecting 
and distributing the tax operates within the United Nations, participating countries will not be required 
to pass a resolution granting the U.N. taxing power. Rather, the individual countries would be taxing 
themselves and merely contributing the proceeds to the organization voluntarily. See supra note 41. 
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proceeds rather than contribute them to the international community.71 The 
existence of a multilateral agreement, with provisions governing enforcement 
of the tax and dispute settlement, could minimize such a risk.72 
In entering into the multilateral agreements required to implement either 
approach, the parties would likely express certain concerns.73 Countries in 
which the tax is imposed would seek to ensure that participating international 
organizations and other signatory countries fulfill their obligations under the 
agreement. Participating international organizations would seek to ensure 
that member countries fulfill their obligations under the agreement. Finally, 
both participating countries and international organizations would seek to 
ensure that governments and organizations that receive the tax proceeds use 
or distribute the funds properly.74 As a result, parties to the required 
multilateral agreements must address accountability and enforcement.75 If the 
multilateral agreements establish an organization to distribute the tax 
proceeds under a larger “umbrella” international organization, the 
agreements may incorporate the “umbrella” organization’s dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 
IV. MULTI-TIERED TOBIN TAX REGIME 
The Tobin Tax is an efficient means by which the international 
community can simultaneously achieve real results in the reduction of 
 
 
 71. Worldpaper, supra note 51. “[This] mechanism would give the major financial powers an 
opportunity to benefit disproportionately. World opinion, however, may find this so outrageous as to 
prevent it from happening.” Id. 
 72. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.  
 73. The parties to a multilateral agreement would consist of (1) countries that either agree to be 
taxed by an international organization or assess and collect the tax at the domestic level and contribute 
the tax to an international organization, and (2) the international organization responsible for receiving 
or collecting the tax and redistributing it to selected organizations or governments for use or 
distribution in developing countries. 
 74.  Collecting countries will seek to ensure that the commission and recipient countries and 
organizations handle tax proceeds properly and other countries impose the tax or allow the 
international organization to do so within their borders pursuant to the agreement. Under the 
international approach, any international organizations responsible for redistributing the tax will seek 
to ensure that member countries continually allow the organization to assess and collect the tax within 
their borders pursuant to the agreement. Under the domestic approach, the international organizations 
will seek to ensure that countries assess and collect the tax, and contribute the proceeds to the 
international organization, properly pursuant to the agreement. 
 75.  If any organizations distributing the proceeds are established under a larger international 
organization, the participat ing parties may incorporate the larger organization’s dispute settlement 
mechanisms into any multilateral agreements in which they enter. The parties to the required 
multilateral agreements will likely incorporate a dispute settlement provision into the agreement, such 
as a provision giving jurisdiction to certain international dispute settlement mechanisms over any 
disputes that arise under the agreements, in order to ensure that they have a means of legal redress if 
other participating parties do not fulfill their obligations or the tax proceeds are mishandled, inter alia. 
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instability within the currency markets and the battle against poverty and 
other issues plaguing developing nations. The issues of implementation and 
enforcement are problematic when considering the Tobin Tax. How will 
international currency transactions be tracked and measured? Who will track 
and measure the transactions? Which transactions will be subject to the tax 
and what institutions will make such decisions? How will an implementing 
institution collect the tax and ensure that it is distributed as the institution 
chooses?  
The most effective means of implementing the tax would be through a 
multi-tiered system of tax collection and distribution.76 On the first tier, 
national governments, hereinafter “collecting governments,” would assess 
and collect the tax at the domestic level through the use of domestic 
institutions currently in place. After collection, the collecting governments 
would reduce the proceeds by the administrative costs they expended in 
assessing and collecting the tax.77 The collecting governments would then 
contribute the proceeds to a commission, which would be responsible for 
distributing the proceeds to national governments, international 
organizations, or nongovernmental organizations for use or distribution.78 
Consequently, on the second tier, the commission would determine how the 
tax proceeds would be spent. As with the first tier, the commission would 
reduce the tax proceeds by administrative costs, including contributions to a 
“participation fund,” prior to distributing the proceeds to the selected 
recipients.79 
The final tier of the system would be administrative. There are two 
important considerations in implementing this system. First, the contributing 
governments, the commission, and the recipient governments or 
organizations must be held accountable for their use of the proceeds. In order 
to ensure accountability, a separate and independent organization would be 
responsible for periodically auditing the parties to ensure that contributing 
 
 
 76.  While this proposal is entirely original, its basic structure bears some resemblance to other 
proposals. See supra notes 11, 63. 
 77.  The multilateral agreement to which participating countries must be parties should include a 
definition of “administrative costs.” See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 78.  The commission would likely be an organization operating within a larger international 
organization, such as the United Nations. The commission would consist of representatives from both 
developing and industrialized countries. The participation of developing countries in the commission is 
particularly important because the commission will be responsible for determining where and how the 
proceeds of the tax will be used. Thus, participation in the commission would enable developing 
countries to play a greater role in international decision making that affects them directly. See supra 
notes 18-19, 70 and accompanying text. 
 79.  See supra note 77. The parties to the multilateral agreement will determine by agreement if 
the commission may reduce the tax proceeds by the same kind and amount of administrative costs as 
those which participating countries deduct from the tax proceeds. See infra text accompanying note 87. 
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governments and the commission are only reducing the proceeds by existing 
administrative costs and passing the entire amount of remaining proceeds to 
the next tier.80 In addition, the independent organization would periodically 
audit the recipient governments and organizations to ensure they are 
distributing or using the tax proceeds as mandated by the commission. A 
second consideration is that interested parties must be entitled to enforce the 
obligations of the contributing governments, the commission, and the 
recipient governments or organizations.81 If the commission is established 
under a larger “umbrella” organization, interested parties may utilize the 
“umbrella” organization’s dispute settlement mechanism.82 
In order to implement the multi-tiered strategy outlined above, 
participating countries must enter into a multilateral agreement.83 The 
agreement would include several components. It would outline the 
obligations of collecting countries, including an obligation to assess and 
collect the tax domestically. It may also explain how countries would go 
about doing so.84 Effective implementation of this regime only requires the 
participation of a small number of industrialized countries.85 In order to 
 
 
 80.  The independent organization’s services may be deducted from tax proceeds as 
“administrative costs” at the first or second tier of the regime, as mandated by the required multilateral 
agreements. See supra note 74. 
 81.  In designing an effective dispute settlement mechanism provision for this agreement, a 
relatively wide variety of parties must be given standing to sue under the agreement. They must be 
given standing because some countries may participate in the regime as both collecting governments 
and members of the commission, potentially giving rise to collusion. For example, if several 
participating countries that are both collecting countries and prominent members of the commission 
choose not to fulfill their obligations under the agreement, the commission may not enforce those 
countries’ obligations. If the agreement only entitles participating countries and the commission to 
enforce obligations under the agreement, recipient organizations and developing countries would be 
left without legal remedy in the hypothetical situation. By allowing other parties, such as recipient 
governments or organizations, to have standing to enforce the parties’ obligations under the agreement, 
it is less likely that collusion can or will take place. In addition to the preventative rationale, allowing 
broad standing would reduce any appearance of impropriety. Given the potentially bountiful tax 
proceeds, the international community, participating governments, and constituents of national leaders 
would likely approve of a mechanism that would improve accountability in the regime. 
 82.  The United Nations would be an ideal international organization in which the commission 
could operate because it contains established and arguably effective dispute settlement mechanisms, 
such as the International Court of Justice. See supra note 75. 
 83.  Actual implementation would likely require a series of agreements. 
 84.  Initial agreements may establish general guidelines on how collecting countries would assess 
and collect the tax, including giving collecting countries the right to reduce the tax proceeds by 
administrative costs incurred by the collecting governments. See supra note 77. More detailed 
guidelines would likely be addressed in later negotiations between participating governments or 
between collecting governments and the commission. 
 85.  See supra note 54. While participation from many countries, both industrialized and 
developing, would be ideal, a high level of international participation would be both difficult and 
impracticable to achieve. The controversial nature of the Tobin Tax suggests that even a small number 
of countries would have difficulty agreeing on how to implement the tax and distribute or spend its 
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encourage their participation, the agreement could entitle collecting 
governments to reduce other foreign aid obligations that would otherwise be 
payable to countries entitled to distributions of Tobin Tax proceeds.86  
 
 
proceeds. Consequently, any attempt to implement the tax will likely be more successful if only 
minimal international cooperation is required. Though it would be unfortunate to exclude developing 
nations from agreements addressing collection of the tax, developing nations’ economic situations 
indicate that the tax would have little or no direct effect on the economies of developing countries. In 
fact, limiting participation in initial agreements to the countries with dominant currencies actually 
benefits developing countries by eliminating the cost of participating in what could be lengthy 
negotiations. See supra notes 18-19. It would likewise be unfortunate to exclude industrialized 
countries, other than the countries with dominant currencies, or countries with transitional economies 
from agreements addressing collection of the tax. However, given the difficulty in garnering 
widespread cooperation, accomplishing implementation would be faster and easier without the 
cooperation of countries other than the countries with dominant currencies. Despite the limitation on 
participation in initial decision making, the tax will be effective because the majority of currency 
transactions will still be taxed and the tax proceeds will still be substantial. See supra note 56 
(discussing the unlikelihood that most transactions will shift to tax haven countries).  Once the tax has 
been implemented within the countries with dominant currencies, other countries may be allowed to 
participate in the regime. 
 86.  Given the controversial nature of the tax, an incentive to participate is necessary. The 
incentive shifts the burden of providing aid to developing countries from collecting countries’ 
governments to private parties. Because the proposed multilateral agreement would relieve 
industrialized countries of their aid obligations to developing countries that receive financial assistance 
from the commission, the proposed agreement would be inconsistent with the pre-existing agreements 
establishing such aid obligations. The “last–in–time” doctrine provides that, when two treaties are 
inconsistent, the most recently enacted treaty controls. Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 
(1888). However, because the last–in–time doctrine only applies to parties to treaties, the proposed 
multilateral agreement would only affect those countries that ratify it, namely industrialized countries. 
Because developing countries’ legal interests would be unaffected, they could potentially bring legal 
actions and prevail against industrialized countries for breaching the pre-existing treaties that 
established the aid obligations. In order to remedy this situation, the commission should require 
countries that receive tax proceeds to agree to relinquish their legal rights against industrialized 
countries under pre-existing treaties in order to receive funding from the commission. Such an 
agreement would likely meet the Vienna Convention’s requirement that treaties may only be amended 
by agreement of the parties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 39, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. Developing countries could alternatively elect to keep their financial assistance under 
pre-existing treaties, thereby foregoing funding from the commission. Given the Tobin Tax’s revenue-
raising potential, most developing countries will likely be entitled to more financial assistance from the 
commission and would therefore agree to release their rights against industrialized countries in most 
cases. See supra note 35. Consequently, contingent distribution of the tax proceeds to developing 
countries would ensure that industrialized countries receive the benefit  of reduced aid in most cases. 
Contingent distribution of tax proceeds will have the added effect of maintaining developing countries’ 
sovereignty by allowing them to choose the source of their aid.  
 The incentive is subject to two main limitations. First, it would only replace financial assistance. 
Industrialized countries’ obligations to provide nonfinancial aid, such as technical assistance, would 
continue. 
 Second, in accordance with the commission’s contingent distributions, the incentive would only 
operate to reduce or eliminate collecting countries’ foreign aid obligations to countries that would 
directly or indirectly receive tax proceeds from the commission. As indicated in Part II, the idea of 
imposing a tax, particularly the Tobin Tax, on international business transactions is highly 
controversial and much maligned by some commentators. Consequently, national leaders of countries 
with dominant currencies, especially those of the United States, may have difficulty garnering 
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The agreement would also establish the commission and outline its duties 
and obligations. The participation of developing countries in the commission 
is essential because the commission would be addressing and seeking to 
resolve issues directly affecting developing countries. In order to ensure that 
developing countries can participate in the commission, the agreement would 
establish a “participation fund” to reduce the financial burden on developing 
countries for such participation. The participation fund would be funded by 
tax proceeds and would be used to pay expenses incurred by developing 
countries in order to participate in the commission.87 
Implementation at the domestic level would be the most effective 
solution, but would lack the power of a large international organization and 
the availability of international dispute mechanisms that implementation at 
the international level could provide. Only a multi-tiered regime could 
combine the efficient, low-cost benefits of domestic implementation with the 
advantages of international implementation. With the addition of 
accountability and dispute settlement mechanisms, the multi-tiered regime 
becomes a practical and effective means of implementing the Tobin Tax. 
Finally, the most prominent industrialized countries will be enticed to 
participate in the regime in order to utilize its foreign aid incentive, and 
developing countries will have the financial capacity to fully and actively 
participate in the commission’s distribution of tax proceeds. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Globalization and the unrestricted free-floating currency system have 
become a lethal combination for the economies of developing countries. The 
renowned economist James Tobin’s proposal for international monetary 
reform through a tax on international currency transactions offers a unique 
and potentially effective solution to the dual problems of economic instability 
caused by currency speculation and the financial needs of developing 
countries. Because it would be assessed at such a low rate and would only 
affect a specific type of international financial transaction, the Tobin Tax 
would benefit the global economy and favor the needs of developing 
 
 
sufficient support within their borders for their countries to adopt the Tobin Tax at all, much less 
implement it under the proposed regime. The incentive allows national leaders to demonstrate to their 
constituents that the tax may benefit industrialized countries as well as developing ones by reducing 
collecting governments’ financial obligations to developing countries while penalizing the private 
parties that benefit from instability in the international currency market. 
 87.  See supra notes 18-19. Thus, this proposal relieves developing countries of the financial 
burdens involved in negotiating the multilateral agreement, participating on the commission, and 
implementing the tax within their borders if they so choose. See supra notes 20-22, 85. 
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countries while having little or no impact on long-term currency transactions. 
In order to implement the tax in the most effective, efficient, and least costly 
manner, a multi-tiered regime should be established wherein national 
governments assess and collect the tax at the domestic level. The national 
governments would then contribute the proceeds to an international 
organization for distribution to developing countries. If negotiated and 
implemented properly, a multi-tiered regime could reduce industrialized 
countries’ foreign aid obligations while allowing developing countries to 
both benefit from and participate in international decision making. 
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